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T H E TACTICS AT SALAMIS-A SUGGESTION.
THE object of this note is to suggest a new interpretation of an incident related by Herodotus in his account of the battle of Salamis, an interpretation which may contribute to a more complete reconstruction of the tactics than has hitherto been arrived at. The suggestion is in effect a modification of the theory of the battle put forward by Dr. Macan in his commentary on Herodotus IV.-IX.
There are two broad questions raised by ancient accounts of the battle which any reconstruction must attempt to answer, [a) Why did the Greeks win ? (b) Why did the Persians enter the strait ?
(a) It is no satisfactory answer to say that the Persians, in the narrow piece of water where the battle was fought, found their numerical superiority a handicap. Mere numbers need not hamper a fleet in such a position : in Thuc. II. 89 Phormio assumes that the smaller fleet is at a disadvantage in a confined space. It was their commanding position which gave the Greeks their victory, as Dr. Macan has shown.
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As the Persian line sailed up the strait, the Greeks, stationed along Cynosura, fell upon their flank, and the Greek victory was assured.
(b) But the more satisfactory the answer to the first question, the more pressing does the second become. As Dr. Macan says, the Greek policy was to entice the Persians into the strait: the Persians should either have driven the Greeks into the open, or have waited for hunger and disunion to win their victory for them. This is what they originally intended: in the sequel they did what above all things they should have avoided. What caused this suicidal change of plan ?
The whole responsibility is thrown upon the mysterious message of Themistocles. Ancient accounts of this message, as has frequently been pointed out, are most conflicting. But Aeschylus and Herodotus agree as to its supreme significance : whatever its substance was, whenever it was sent, and whatever other result it had, it certainly occasioned the fatal Persian manoeuvre of the following morning, and won Salamis for Greece.
But is it really credible that the Persians were prepared light-heartedly to sacrifice their whole advantage of position, on account of a message claiming to proceed from a Greek admiral who professed secret friendship for the King ? Disunion and medism in the Greek camp were indeed neither impossible nor improbable: the message would cause the Persians to keep a sharp lookout for confirmatory signs: but it would do no more. If, however, next morning any movement in the Greek fleet was visible which seemed to corroborate the promise of desertion that Themistocles had made, the easy confidence with which the Persians sailed up the strait is explained. Is there any evidence of such a movement ?
It is of course not to be imagined for a moment that a genuine flight on the morning of the battle was either contemplated or attempted. But a feigned flight may well have been proposed as a necessary complement to the otherwise valueless message of Themistocles. This is to assume that the other Greek leaders were parties to that message; in any case, Herodotus is probably wrong in representing them as victims of the trick equally with the Persian.
Do our accounts contain any hint of this feigned flight ? It has been suggested by more than one commentator 1 that the temporary wavering of the Greeks noticed by Herodotus a clearer indication than this in the same authority; and it is to be sought in the curious story of the behaviour of Adeimantus and his Corinthians.
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The Athenian version is that as soon as the battle opened, the Corinthians fled in a panic. Opposite the temple of Athene Sciras they are met by a mysterious vessel, and are informed that the Greeks are winning. They return to find the battle over. In reply to this the Corinthians declare that they were ev irpanoiai, T»}S i/aiz/ia^ti??, and the rest of Greece, says Herodotus, agrees with them rather than with the Athenians. Athenian malice of course kept the discreditable version alive. But is it likely that either story is pure invention ? The interpretation of the incident suggested by Macan, and subsequently by How and Wells, is as follows. Diodorus reports the sending of an Egyptian squadron round the south of Salamis to block the other entrance to the straits. The Corinthians, it is suggested, must have been told off to engage this column, and having done so successfully they returned to the main body, to firtd the battle over. But there are objections to this theory.
1. The total absence of this important feature of the engagement from our better authorities. No reliance is to be placed on Diodorus or his sources. The alleged movement of the Egyptian squadron may itself be a garbled version of the manoeuvre reported by Aeschylus 4 -the stationing of sentinel ships round the island.
2. Equally curious is the silence of Corinthian tradition. In the epitaph 5 on the Corinthians slain at Salamis the enemies against whom they fought are given as Medes, Persians, and .Phoenicians. Even if the last two lines of the inscription as given by Plutarch are later than the first couplet, the total absence from Corinthian tradition of any engagement other than the main one is very strange.
It seems distinctly more probable that the behaviour of the Corinthians gives the clue to the battle. Their feigned flight was deliberately planned by the admirals, at the instance of Themistocles, to increase the effect of the message sent to the King. The manoeuvre was misunderstood at the time, and misrepresented later by a tradition hostile to the Corinthians.
Unfortunately the position of the temple of Athene cannot be identified with sufficient certainty to be of any help. By some scholars-e.g., Lolling and Hauvette-it is placed on the northeast of the island near the opening into • the Bay of Eleusis, by others at various points further west. Evidently the north-east position suits best this interpretation of the incident. The CorinHerodotus then knows the tradition of the feint, but fails to connect it with the message of Themistocles. What of Aeschylus ? The poet would neither see nor care to relate all the incidents of the engagement. But a consideration of the relevant lines in the Persae shows that the Corinthian incident is by no means alien to the battle as he describes it.
1. He begins his description of the fighting thus:
irdpa This is the first dramatic contact of the fleets: the Persians are filing
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thians sailed up the strait till they wefe just out of sight, and the Persians were well inside, then returned to take part in the fighting. The ice\y<; ffeCy •jropTrfj may be a boat sent to give the signal for return: or else this divine intervention simply stands for an inexplicable change of tactics, like the similar intervention of the Qdarfia yvvaiicos in the case of the main squadron. There is no reason to believe that the whole Persian fleet was engaged: but after the victory the remnant which never entered the strait was no longer formidable either in numbers or in prestige.
hurriedly up the strait, the Corinthians are just turning, the rest of the Greeks are sailing into action after their feigned hesitation. This is precisely the situation imagined. The Persians at first think that the Greeks are actually in full flight. Too late they are undeceived. Hunt's punctuation, which I have given, is clearly wrong; but I doubt if Von Arnim is right in connecting ijjeveiretv w i t h <f>piKTrj<:, n o r d o I suppose that iSes is used exactly in the sense ' to see.' It is rather to ' look on,' with a view to writing on it: a strange use, but one that is more or less established by Herodas IV. 74, where Dr. Headlam cited Himer. Or. XIV. 23. It is not followed in these passages by an infinitive, but we know this as a use of fi\eTreiv. Alexis, fr. 97, Ael. V.H. II. 44. In these two passages the infinitive need bear no other meaning than the nature of the look; but this will not satisfy Menander, Ep. 181,
